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Abstract 
Slurs have become a big topic of discussion both in philosophy and in linguistics. Slurs 
are usually characterised as pejorative terms, co-extensional with other, neutral, terms 
referring to ethnic or social groups. However, slurs are not the only ethnic/social words 
with pejorative senses. Our aim in this paper is to introduce a different kind of pejoratives, 
which we will call “ethnic/social terms used as insults” (ESTIs), as exemplified in 
(European) Spanish, though present in many other languages and mostly absent in 
English. These are ethnic terms like gitano, lit. ‘gipsy’, which can have an extensional 
and neutral use, but also a pejorative meaning building on a negative stereotypical 
representation of the Romani community.  
 
1. Introduction 
Slurs have become a big topic of discussion both in philosophy and in linguistics. 
Linguistically, many authors analyse slurs as mixed expressives (McCready 2010; 
Gutzmann 2015). Roughly, they have both a truth-conditional meaning (also called “at-
issue”) and a use-conditional (or “not at-issue”) meaning. For instance, let Kraut stand 
for a slur word directed at German people: its analysis would be as in (1) (from Gutzmann 
and McCready 2016, ex. (3)): 
(1) Dan is a Kraut. 
a. Truth-conditional: ‘Dan is German.’ 
b. Use-conditional: ‘I have a negative attitude towards Germans.’ 
There is some debate as to whether this attitudinal approach towards slurs is appropriate 
(see, e.g., Camp, 2013, 2016, Hom, 2008, Jeshion, 2013, Marques & García-Carpintero, 
forth, Williamson, 2009), as well as to how to model their alleged not at-issue (henceforth 
NAI) content. Slurs are usually characterised as pejorative terms, co-extensional with 
other, neutral, terms referring to ethnic or social groups: Kraut is a slur, whereas German 
is the neutral term; Kraut has a NAI, projective and derogatory content that German 
lacks. One way of capturing such content is an attitudinal report as in (1)b: ‘I despise this 
community / these people are not worthy of my esteem’ (but see Marques & García-
Carpintero, forth). Usually, however, NAI content is assumed to also include reference 
to some negative stereotype: ‘I despise this community whose members are such and 
                                               
1 The order of authors is alphabetical. 
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so and do this and that’ (Camp, 2013; see below for discussion). Usually, the use of a 
slur extends this kind of signalling to the addressee. Thus, the speaker assumes that the 
attitude reported in the NAI content is also shared by the hearer and a group to which 
the speaker certainly belongs—and seems proud of belonging in. 
However, slurs are not the only ethnic/social words with pejorative senses. Here, we 
will focus on what we call “ethnic/social terms used as insults” (ESTIs), as exemplified in 
(European) Spanish. These are ethnic terms like gitano ‘Romani’ and moro ‘Moor’, terms 
for professions with behavioural stereotypes, such as camionero ‘truck-driver’ and 
portera ‘doorwoman’, and even terms for age groups, such as viejo/vieja ‘old 
man/woman’ and adolescente ‘teenager’ (see below). Many other languages (see §2 
below for examples) have similar terms, but they have not been discussed in the 
literature. 
To bring the point home, a term akin to an ESTI  in English could be the term Nazi, 
which can be interpreted as a neutral term or as an insult, as exemplified in (2)a and b. 
(2) Hubert is a Nazi. 
a. Hubert belongs to the Nazi movement. 
b. Hubert exhibits properties that belong to the social stereotype of a Nazi. 
Crucially, under the interpretation in (2)b, the noun is generally not predicated of the 
members of the neutral extension.2 Something analogous happens when speakers, 
addressing a boy, say you are such a girl, or addressing a grown up, you are such a 
child, etc.  
Now focusing on social and ethnic terms, what is special in Spanish is that these 
two interpretations can be teased apart on the basis of the properties of the linguistic 
context in which the social and ethnic terms appear. Take (3) as a first illustration.3 
(3) a. Antonia es porter-a. 
     Antonia    is   doorperson-FEM 
‘Antonia (female name) is a doorwoman.’ 
b. Antonio es *(un-a) porter-a. 
    Antonio      is      a-FEM doorperson-FEM 
                                               
2 Consider, for instance, the following naturally-occurring examples:  
 
(i) a. But that's why I'm not a mod [moderator], I'm such a nazi when it comes to keep a forum 
straight. :oops: 
https://www.mechspecs.com/threads/ace-of-spades-every-mech.9238/ 
b. I cannot thank enough my nazi of a father who ONLY allowed us to have water with meals 
growing up.  Now I love it and don’t have an addiction to soda or juice. 
https://thehealthypineapple.com/tag/pretzels/ 
Thanks to Manuel García-Carpintero for providing the example. 
3 List of abbreviations: 1 = first person, 2 = second person, 3 = third person, EVAL = evaluative 
morpheme, FEM = feminine, MASC = masculine, NEG = negation, PL = plural, SG = singular. 
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‘Antonio (male name) is a doorwoman.’ 
A sentence such as (3)a states that Antonia works as a door woman. As will be presented 
in greater detail in §2.1 below, profession-denoting nouns must occur as bare nominals 
in copular constructions when it is conveyed that the subject is in the extension of the 
noun. The presence of the indefinite would render the sentence unacceptable under this 
interpretation. Let us now turn to (3)b. First, observe that the noun is necessarily 
preceded by the indefinite. Second, portera is inflected as a feminine form and the 
subject is male, so we can rule out the possibility that the copular construction conveys 
that Antonio works as a doorman. In Spanish, evaluative nouns in copular constructions 
are introduced by the indefinite un (i.e., they do not appear bare), so the presence of the 
indefinite in (3)b is flagging that only an evaluative interpretation of the noun is available. 
In fact, in this case, the feminine word for this profession, portera ‘doorwoman’, must be 
interpreted as a pejorative evaluative noun, typically predicated over individuals who are 
not members of its extension, to suggest that they are gossips. This minimal pair 
evidences how the ethnic and social terms depicted in this paper are used as insults in 
specific linguistic contexts. Throughout the paper, we will make use of these linguistic 
constraints to explain the distribution of ESTIs in Spanish and to compare ESTIs with 
other slurring expressions, so as to prove that ESTIs are indeed a separate category on 
their own merit.  
 
An important issue to be addressed before we begin with the presentation of linguistic 
data is the extent to which we can consider ESTIs to be pejorative terms.4 One could 
think that the pejorative uses of the terms we will discuss are the effect of coercion or of 
pragmatics, with the implication that ESTIs would not form a class of pejoratives. There 
would be pejorative uses of the terms that we deal with, but such uses would depend on, 
e.g., the availability of a stereotype to both speaker and hearer, and not on conventions 
or anything semantic. 
 
We think that ESTIs are polysemous terms, such that the relationship between the 
extensional and the pejorative uses of an ESTI is akin to the mass/count uses of 
polysemous expressions such as beer (I drank beer/ I drank a beer). In the “beer” case, 
the term has a certain meaning/sense in certain linguistic environments (“mass” 
environments), and another meaning/sense in other environments (“count” 
environments). However, this does not imply that, e.g., the indefinite article coerces a 
mass meaning into a count meaning. At least, some empirical evidence suggests the 
                                               
4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
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contrary (Schumacher, 2013): retrieving the count meaning is not costly compared to 
other cases where there is coercion (e.g., the “ham sandwich” case). So, the fact that 
the different meanings typically appear in different syntactic environments does not mean 
that they are not polysemous (as the “beer” case attests).  
 
Then, there is, as a matter of fact, a conventional stereotype that is retrieved by default 
in non-extensional uses of our paradigmatic example, gitano, something that does not 
happen in cases like alemán ‘German’, which can pick up different stereotypes on 
different occasions in constructions such as X es muy alemán (‘X is very German’), 
where alemán may stand for stubborn, but also for efficient, etc. Aside from the linguistic 
facts that we will introduce below, which make the difference between alemán and gitano 
more perspicuous, this fact alone suggests that the relation between the ESTI gitano and 
the stereotype is conventional, i.e. that the stereotype is a conventional meaning of the 
term.  
 
Also, the empirical evidence collected by authors working on dual-character concepts 
(Reuter, 2019) supports our view. According to these authors, some terms/concepts 
have a normative dimension (e.g., scientist): one way to test whether they have such 
normative dimension is to ask subjects to react to true modification (such as Jane is a 
true scientist). When the features listed by subjects show a high degree of coincidence, 
we have reason to believe that people share a certain ideal of what it is to be, e.g., a 
scientist. In such cases, concepts themselves are said to have a dual character (and not 
all concepts have such a dual character: co-worker does not have a normative 
dimension). We think that in the “gitano” case the issue is even clearer, to the extent that 
the pejorative meaning of the word appears in some dictionaries.5 So, again: (i) the 
stereotype the term relates to is stable across subjects and contexts, and (ii) using the 
term  is a conventional way to refer to the features that form part of the stereotype (i.e., 
it is a conventional way to mean “robber, liar”, etc.). The picture then is one where we 
have two conventional uses of a term, both being easy to retrieve (i.e. one does not have 
to activate one as a means to retrieve the other). This strongly suggests the polysemy 
                                               
5 The pre-2014 editions of the RAE (Royal Academy for the Spanish Language) dictionary used 
to capture this meaning in this way: “trapacero; que estafa u obra con engaño” (‘crook; 
someone who scams or deceives’). Then, in 2014, after protests from the Romani community, it 
explained the content of the pejorative meaning of ‘gitano’ simply by making it a synomym of 
“trapacero” (crook) and adding, as metadata, that the meaning is pejorative. Representatives of 








Now, the paper is organised as follows: in the next, second, section we introduce ESTIs 
and present data that illustrate their behaviour, showing that they belong to a different 
category than slurs. While ESTIs pattern together with other evaluatives, slurs belong to 
a different class of pejoratives. In the third section we propose an analysis of their AI and 
NAI content, again comparing them to slurs; the discussion of slurs includes previous  
accounts that are relevant to exploring further the differences between ESTIs and slurs. 
We will not do a thorough revision of the different positions on the AI and NAI content of 
slurs, since our main purpose here is to convince the reader that the pejoratives that we 
talk about differ in many dimensions from slurs. In this regard, we argue for two key 
characteristics of ESTIs: the AI content is a stereotype and the NAI content a generic 
that collects stereotypical beliefs. We finally contend that using ESTIs is a particular way 
of being racist, classist or sexist, which endorses and perpetuates stereotypes. 
 
2. Data  
ESTIs are highly productive in (European) Spanish. However, this phenomenon is not 
limited to Spanish: these uses of ethnic terms, terms of professions or of ages as insults 
can be found in many other languages. For instance, German has Bauer (‘farmer’, with 
an inference of being simple-minded), Oma/Opa,(‘grandma’/’grandpa’, with an inference 
of being grumpy, boring, conservative), Schwabe (‘Swabian’, a region in southwestern 
Germany; an inference is being tight-fisted or cheap); Italian has pescivendola (‘woman 
who sells fish’) and ortolana (‘woman who sells vegetables’), both with an inference of 
being crude, loud, unrefined, and camionista (‘truck driver’), as someone rude, rough, 
uneducated and dirty; BCS6 has seljak (‘peasant’, with an inference of being crude or 
unrefined), etc. The ESTI ‘gipsy’ is also found in a number of languages, with a pejorative 
meaning very close to that of Spanish: e.g., zingaro in Italian or tigan in Rumanian. 
Traditional terms like these that refer to the Romani people oscillate between being 
ESTIs, being slurs and being a more complicated thing that we will not deal with here: 
slurs towards members and insults directed at non-group members at the same time.  
English is interestingly different from all these languages in that, while proliferous in slurs 
and similar pejoratives, it has few ESTIs. The now archaic use of the verb to jew (down), 
meaning ‘to cheat’, has obvious similarities with the pejorative use of gitano in Spanish, 




although it lacks the neutral use that gitano has. Uses of child and teenager for reckless- 
or immature-behaving adults, grandpa/grandma or dad/mom for non-family members 
with conservative/boring inferences, or the sexist use of girl, prima facie are similar to 
ESTIs, although they lack a key component of them, which is the stability of the 
stereotype.7 As mentioned above, another good example is the use of Nazi to denote a 
cluster of properties associated with actual Nazism. The rest of this article will focus on 
the European Spanish examples, using gitano ‘Romani’ in particular. This section will 
provide linguistic diagnostics for ESTIs. 
 
2.1. ESTIs appear in the syntactic environments of evaluative nouns 
The main property of ESTIs is that they behave like evaluative nouns (also known as 
degree or quality nouns) from a purely linguistic point of view. That is, they are acceptable 
only in syntactic contexts that are available to nouns such as genio ‘genius’, idiota ‘idiot’ 
or chupatintas ‘pencil-pusher, lit. ink-sucker’. This shows a striking contrast with slurs, 
which can occur (and typically occur) outside such contexts.  
In her typology of evaluative nouns, Masià (2019) describes these nouns as not 
only assigning a property, but also expressing a value judgment, which can be positive, 
but tends to be negative. In that sense, they are analogous to “thick terms” in philosophy 
(Williams, 1985). In previous literature, authors like Milner (1978), Suñer Gratacós 
(1999), Hernanz (2001) and Ruwet (1982) assume evaluative nouns have an affective 
feature, whereas Bolinger (1972), Mathushanksy (2002) or Espinal (2013) believe they 
lexicalize a degree argument. Masià (2019) proposes that the key component all 
evaluative nouns share is that they are expressive in the sense of Potts (2005).  
Our goal here is not to investigate evaluative nouns as such, so we will not commit 
to which option is best, but we will have something to say about ESTIs’ NAI behaviour in 
section 3. In what follows, we will display the main properties of ESTIs as a kind of 
evaluative noun, pointing at differences with slurs.  
 
2.1.1. N1 of an N2 construction 
                                               
7 As a referee points out, there is no fixed subset of negative or positive properties of a cluster 
associated with a term that would guarantee that these terms will be systematically used as a 
pejorative or an insult. Take 'dad' (examples provided by the reviewer): 
- He wears high-waisted trousers and has been putting on weight. He's such a dad! (he 
has a negative feature of dads) 
- She raised all the kids alone, working full time. She was a mom and a dad for them. 
(i.e., she has the positive features of moms and dads) 
- He fathered 7 children, abandoned them, and never paid any childcare. He's not a 





As shown by Bolinger (1972), Suñer Gratacós (1990,1999), Doetjes and Rooryck (2003), 
Villalba and Bartra-Kaufmann (2010), Masià (2019), evaluative nouns can occupy N1 in 
the N1 of an N2 construction. This is exemplified in (4), where evaluative and non-
evaluative nouns are compared. In (5), we see how an ESTI can occupy N1, unlike slurs.8 
 
 
(4) Masià (2019: 298-299) 
a. la         sociata /           la       matasanos  de la   vecina 
    the.FEM socialist.pejorative  the.FEM  witch_doctor   of  the.FEM neighbour.FEM 
    ‘that socialist.pejorative/the witch doctor of a neighbour’ 
b. #la      política /      la         médica    de la  vecina 
    the.FEM politician.FEM   the.FEM doctor.FEM   of  the.FEM neighbour.FEM 
#‘that politician/doctor of a neighbour’ 
(5) a. el          gitano      de tu    cuñado 
the.MASC   Romani.MASC    of  your   brother-in-law 
‘your Romani_ESTI of a brother-in-law’ 
b. #el          gabacho         de tu      cuñado 
the.MASC    French_slur.MASC of  your brother-in-law 
#‘your French_slur of a brother-in-law’ 
 
2.1.2. Verbless exclamatives 
As studied by Vinet (1991), Hernanz (2001), Munaro (2006) and Masià (2019), evaluative 
nouns such as matasanos ‘quack, witch doctor’ and sociata ‘socialist +pejorative’ can 
occur as verbless exclamatives of the sort depicted in (6), to be compared with the ill-
formedness of utterances with the (by default) non-evaluative nouns médica ‘doctor.FEM’ 
and política ‘politician.FEM’, (7). 
(6) ¡Una matasanos / una sociata, esta vecina! (Masià 2019:300) 
‘A witch doctor / a socialist, this neighbour!’ 
(7) #¡Una médica / una política, esta vecina! 
#‘A doctor / a politician, this neighbour!’ 
Likewise, an ESTI can be the main predicate of a verbless exclamative, (8), in opposition 
to a slur, (9). 
(8) ¡Un gitano, tu cuñado! 
‘A Romani_ESTI, your brother-in-law!’ 
(9) #¡Un gabacho, tu cuñado!  
                                               
8 The English equivalent of the N1 of an N2 construction is best with a demonstrative or 
possessive pronoun modifying N1, unlike the Spanish. 
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#‘A French_slur, your brother-in-law!’ 
 
2.2. The emphatic Spanish indefinite 
Copular constructions in Spanish obey different constraints from copular constructions 
in other languages, including English. Focusing on noun phrase predicates,9 two main 
options are available, either a bare noun (i.e., without a determiner) and a noun phrase 
headed by a determiner. Interestingly, depending on the properties of the predicate noun, 
different interpretations may arise.10 For instance, professions are introduced as bare 
nouns in Spanish, without the indefinite determiner (unlike English). That explains the 
fact illustrated in (10). 
(10) Sara es (*una) neurólog-a. 
Sara   is        a      neurologist.FEM 
‘Sara is a neurologist.’ 
In more depth, descriptive grammarians analyse the [Copula + bare noun] construction 
as bearing a classificatory interpretation. Hence, Fernández Leborans (1999) claims that 
the attribute (i.e., the bare noun) characterizes an individual as a member of a category. 
This generally applies to nouns that refer to humans and this predication concerns socio-
cultural distinctions, social roles or functions, such as profession, rank, post and 
profession. As for ethnic terms such as alemán ‘German’, traditional grammarians 
analyse them as relational adjectives that can be re-categorised as nouns (see e.g. 
Bosque 1993, 1999). Hence, it is expected that they appear bare in copular constructions 
to indicate that the subject is a member of the extension, although they can also behave 
like nouns in other linguistic contexts, as will be clear shortly. Going back to professions, 
if we want to say of a man that he works as a writer, in Spanish we have to use a bare 
noun, as in (11)a. As observed by Bosque (1996), this kind of predication is an answer 
to a question of the sort in (11)b. Finally, a last grammatical property of this construction 
has to do with the kind of modifiers the predicate noun can bear, namely relational 
adjectives and other modifiers that create subkinds. In (11)c, the prepositional phrase 
modifier creates a subkind of writer. In contrast, a restrictive modifier that narrows down 
the set in the extension of the noun is unacceptable in this position. 
                                               
9 And leaving aside specificational and equative copular constructions. On this, see Higgins 
(1979), Partee (1986), Heycock (1994), Moro (1997) and Mikkelsen (2005), a.m.o. The cases 
we deal with are predicational, whereby the predicate is the noun phrase following the copula 
and the subject is another noun phrase which is the argument of the predicate. 
10 On the distinction in Italian, see Korzen (1982), in French, Jeunot (1983) and Pollock (1983), 




(11) Bosque (1996)11 
a. Este     hombre es escritor. 
     this.MASC man          is   writer 
‘This man is a writer.’ 
b. ¿Qué es este      hombre? 
       what  is   this.MASC man 
‘Who is this man?’ 
 c. Este     hombre es escritor {de novela corta / *que conocí en la biblioteca}. 
     this.MASC man          is  writer         of   novella                    that I met in the library 
 ‘This man is a writer {of novellas/*that I met in the library}.’ 
Interesting for our purposes is the comparison between the previous structure and the 
[Copula + indefinite noun phrase] construction. Grammarians such as Bosque (1996) 
and Fernández Leborans (1999) describe this structure as carrying an identificational 
interpretation. It distinguishes the subject among the individuals in the relevant 
contextual domain. Usually, the noun occurs with an additional restrictive modifier. 
Otherwise, the result can be unnatural, since the noun on its own is not enough 
information to specify who the referent of the subject is. To grasp the difference with the 
[Copula + bare noun] construction, let us compare (11) with (12). (12)a is natural to the 
extent that predicating of the subject that he is a writer is enough to pick out who that 
man is (among the rest of relevant individuals). Unlike in (11)b, the sentence in (12)a is 
an answer to the question in (12)b. And, finally, while subkind-making modifiers are 
allowed, restrictive modifiers such as the one in (12)c are also possible in this 
construction.  
(12) Bosque (1996) 
a. Este     hombre es un       escritor. 
this.MASC man          is   a.MASC  writer.MASC 
‘This man is a writer.’ 
b. ¿Quién es  este      hombre? 
who          is   this.MASC man 
‘Who is this man?’ 
c. Este      hombre es un       escritor {de novela corta / que conocí en la biblioteca}. 
 this.MASC man         is    a.MASC writer        of      novella              that I met in the library 
 ‘This man is a writer {of novellas/that I met in the library}.’ 
 
                                               
11 We provide our own glosses and translations of examples from sources written in Spanish 
(Bosque, 1996; Farnández Leborans, 1999; and Fernández Lagunilla, 1983). 
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Therefore, a social term (such as one referring to a profession) will be interpreted in 
different ways depending on whether it is introduced as a bare noun or as an indefinite 
noun phrase.  
Now, in Spanish, the indefinite noun phrase can still receive a different 
interpretation as long as the noun that is introduced is evaluative (see §2.1 for a list of 
syntactic constructions that are sensitive to this distinction). In fact, authors such as 
Fernández Lagunilla (1983), Portolés (1993, 1994), Bosque (1996), Leborans (1999), di 
Tullio and Suñer Gratacós (2008) and Gutiérrez-Rexach (2010) have called this context 
the ‘emphatic un construction’ and have treated this environment as another one of the 
syntactic structures that are sensitive to evaluativity.12 Gutiérrez-Rexach (2010: 684) 
characterizes this construction as “[…] a way of expressing evaluative predication, 
namely, when a predicate expresses a speaker’s strong personal assessment of a group 
or class (of a depreciative or derogatory nature in most occasions).” In fact, it is usually 
negative, e.g. (13)a; but it can also be positive, e.g. (13)b.  
(13) Fernández Leborans (1999: 2373) 
a. Juan es un      {viejo / egoísta /       impostor / ladrón / tirano …}. 
    Juan    is   a.MASC old_man selfish_person imposter       thief          tyrant 
‘Juan is an {old man / a selfish person / an imposter / a thief / a tyrant …}.’ 
b. Pepe es un       {valiente / genio / sabi-o / afortunad-o … }. 
     Pepe    is  a.MASC   brave          genius   wise-MASC lucky.MASC 
 ‘Pepe is {brave man / genius / wise man / lucky man … }.’ 
Importantly, nouns that only have an evaluative reading must occur in the Spanish 
emphatic indefinite environment, as shown in (14). 
(14) Bosque (1996) 
a. Este       hombre es *(un)    monstruo. 
     this.MASC  man          is     a.MASC monster 
‘This man is a monster.’ 
b. María es *(una) farsante. 
     María    is      a.FEM fraud 
‘María is a fraud.’ 
                                               
12 Emphatic un also occurs beyond copular constructions, in examples such as (i), from Rigau 
(1999: 324). In these contexts, the indefinite is unacceptable unless a modifier is added that 
allows for the evaluative interpretation of the noun. 
(i) a. Tengo      un miedo    *(que me muero). 
        have.1SG a.MASC fear  that  me die.1SG 
‘I am (terribly) scared.’ 
b. Tiene       unos hijos *(que son        insoportables). 
    has.3SG   a.MASC.PL     that are.3PL  unbearable.PL 
‘S/he has (unbearable) children.’ 
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On the other hand, nouns that only have a classificatory interpretation and do not provide 
enough information to identify the subject are unacceptable in this environment, as 
illustrated in (15). 
(15) Fernández Lagunilla (1983) 
a. Es un       {padr-azo / ??padre}. 
      is   a.MASC father-EVAL         father 
‘He is {an indulgent father / a father}.’  
b. Es un {tirano / ??gobernador}. 
    is      a.MASC  tyrant  governor 
‘S/he is {a tyrant / governor}.’ 
 
Interestingly, ethnic terms are typically associated with (different) stereotypes, and yet 
they are not evaluative and, as such, can occur bare with the copula but not with the 
indefinite determiner in the emphatic interpretation (they would then have a marginal 
identificational interpretation which could be improved with the addition of an adequate 
restrictive modifier). See for instance (16). 
(16) Manuel es (*un)     alemán. 
Manuel    is     a.MASC German 
‘Manuel is (a) German.’ 
Summing up, where do the nouns that behave as ESTIs stand with respect to the 
emphatic un construction? On the one hand, they are terms which can be used to classify 
individuals under a social or ethnic category, so they are acceptable as bare predicates 
of the copula, (3)a and (17)a. On the other hand, they are evaluative in virtue of being 
associated with negative stereotypical properties,13 which legitimates their occurrence 
as predicates introduced by the indefinite article under the emphatic interpretation, (3)b 
and (17)b. Remember that the identificational interpretation is quite marginal because of 
                                               
13 We have studied the most usual –the conventional- case where the evaluative character of 
gitano is negative. However, it can also have a positive meaning. If a Romani mother tells her 
son (i), she may be reminding him to be proud of what he is—and to act accordingly. In such a 
case, she will be conveying the positive ideal that Romani people may have of themselves 
(which can be shared by other, non-Romani, speakers). It will be a reminder of the positive 
features that he has by virtue of being a Romani, for instance, being a free spirit loyal to the 
community.  
(i) Recuerda: eres       un        gitan-o. 
    remember are.2SG a.MASC Romani-MASC 
‘Remember: you are a Romani.’ 
Gitano here is interpreted in a way similar to a family name. This is typically used with last 
names, as illustrated in (ii), where Lannister is a last name in the fictional Game of Thrones. 
Lannister is presumed to evoke positive properties that have been attached to the lineage since 
its beginning. 
(ii) Recuerda siempre que eres un Lannister. 
‘Always remember you are a Lannister.’ 
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the lack of further specification that can help identify the referent of the subject among 
the rest of individuals in the relevant domain. 
 
(17) a. El Chato es gitano. 
     the Chato is    Romani 
‘Chato is (a) Romani.’ 
b. Manuel es un        gitano. 
     Manuel    is   a.MASC  Romani 
‘Manuel is a Romani_ESTI.’ 
 
 
2.3. Degree modification 
Like evaluative nouns such as idiota ‘idiot’, which have been argued to include a degree 
argument (see e.g. Masià, 2018), ESTIs can be said to be gradable. For instance, 
Masià’s degree nouns can be modified by evaluative adjectives such as suprising or 
unbelievable to express that the property denoted by the noun is held to a high degree 
(de Vries 2010, Nouwen 2011, Masià 2019). The same holds for size adjectives such as 
big, as observed by Morzycki (2009). The contrast is shown in (18).  
 
(18)  Masià (2019:302) 
a. María es una    idiota {increíble / enorme}.   DEGREE 
     María    is   a.FEM  idiot       incredible    enormous 
‘María is an {incredible / enormous} idiot.’ 
b. Es una {matasanos / sociata}            {increíble / enorme}. NON-DEGREE 
     is   a.FEM qua      ck     socialist_pejorative  incredible     enormous 
‘S/he is an {incredible / enormous} {quack / socialist_pejorative}.’ 
 
If we run the same test with an ESTI, probably both interpretations are possible, but the 
degree reading is indeed available, (19). 
(19) a. Tu  cuñado        es un      gitano  {increíble / enorme}.  (NON-)DEGREE 
your brother-in-law is    a.MASC Romani   incredible     enormous 
‘Your brother-in-law is an {incredible / enormous} Romani_ESTI.’ 
b. Ramona es un-a   porter-a        {increíble / enorme}.  (NON-)DEGREE 
  Ramón     is   a-FEM doorperson-FEM  incredible     enormous 
‘Ramona is an {incredible / enormous} doorwoman_ESTI.’ 
The non-degree interpretation in (19)a is one where your brother in law has the negative 
properties of the stereotypes associated with the ESTI and is incredible / huge, the 
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degree reading would be one where your brother in law has many negative stereotypical 
properties of the sort described in the present paper. Likewise for (19)b. 
 
2.4. The auténtico environment  
Masià (2017) argues that Spanish prenominal adjectives of veracity such as verdadero 
‘true’ and auténtico ‘authentic’ must modify nouns that exhibit a kind of vagueness 
induced by having a structure akin to a prototypical structure. Hence, (20)a is interpreted 
as a function that applies to an individual x and it is true iff in all relevant contexts, x is 
an artist. Since artist is a vague noun in the said sense, in order to determine its 
extension, ideal values in dimensions associated to the noun are evoked (for similar data 
on true modification, see: Knobe et al., 2013, del Pinal & Reuter, 2016). For instance, 
high values in criteria such as creativity, originality, output and personality. So, (20)a 
would be true if and only if the person said to be a true artist fits the ideal of an artist 
(very creative, original, etc.). Interestingly, in Spanish, certain preposed and postposed 
adjectives are interpreted differently. Adjectives of veracity are such a case. In contrast 
with (20)a, (20)b would be true of an individual who is a professional artist.  
(20) a. un-a {verdadera / auténtica} artista 
           a-FEM  true                 authentic     artist 
b. un-a artista {verdadera / auténtica} 
     a-FEM artist            true                 authentic 
‘a {true / authentic} artist’ 
 
Moving on to ESTIs, they can also be modified by a preposed adjective of veracity, as 
illustrated in (21)a, or by a postposed adjective of veracity, as exemplified in (21)b. 
Following up on the restrictions observed by Masià (2017), gitano is a vague noun when 
the adjective of veracity precedes it (and hence it is associated with a set of—in this 
case, negative—dimensions with ideal values) and it denotes a possibly narrow set of 
members in the ethnic group when the adjective of veracity follows it. 
(21) a. un       auténtico gitano 
           a.MASC authentic     Romani 
‘a {true/ authentic} Romani_ESTI’ 
b. un      gitano auténtico 
    a.MASC Romani  authentic 
‘a {true/ authentic} Romani’ 
 
So, unlike the artist case, in the case of ESTIs, both in the emphatic un construction and 
in the prenominal auténtico modification, the ESTI picks up on some kind of negative 
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idealisation, referencing a set of stereotypical vices—explaining its usual pejorative 
nature. In postnominal auténtico modifying gitano, as in (21)b, the term denotes 
membership, and it may have some positive connotations (which can be also the case 
of artista auténtico).  
 Such evaluative predicates can always be negative or positive: María es una 
auténtica artista (with the prenominal adjective of veracity) is usually understood as 
complimenting María. But one can have the idea that artists are presumptuous silly 
childish people, in which case María es una auténtica artista would mean that María is 
presumptuous and silly and childish in a high degree. Cases like Julio es un auténtico 
vendedor (‘Julio is a true salesman’, with the adjective of veracity in prenominal position) 
may be a better example: the same sentence from different lips may be praising or 
criticizing Julio. In the case of ESTIs, Manuel es un auténtico gitano (‘Manuel is an 
authentic Romani’, with prenominal auténtico) can also imply positive or negative 
properties; either Manuel is a {traitor, robber …} or Manuel is a {free spirit, loyal to the 
community, …}.14 
 
2.5. Interim summary 
Nouns that behave as ESTIs have two main features: first, they are terms (either nouns 
or adjectives) that refer to ethnic groups or professions, and second, they carry an 
associated set of negative stereotypical properties. These characteristics make them 
suitable in two possible predicational environments in Spanish, with either a classificatory 
interpretation (as bare predicates), or an evaluative interpretation (introduced by the 
indefinite determiner). Being evaluative predicates, ESTIs share properties with a 
broader set of nouns, which occur in specific syntactic structures (such as the N1 of an 
N2 construction or as bare exclamatives).  
 
3. ESTIs as pejoratives 
3.1. Introduction: how ESTIs insult twice 
                                               
14 On this idea, see also footnote 13. Note, however, that ESTIs are unlike other evaluative 
predicates in that their relation with the negative stereotype is both much more stable and 
salient than the relation between e.g., ‘artist’ and its stereotype (positive or negative). On the 
other hand, all ethnic terms can express a positive meaning, especially within –or at least 
arising from- the ethnic community (the same can be said about terms of professions). What is 
peculiar concerning ESTIs is that their associated negative stereotype is very widespread 
outside the ethnic community, to the extent that the term has become a way to denote the 
stereotype (i.e. the cluster of properties that form such a stereotype). The praising use of gitano 
or any other ethnic or social terms that are recurrently used as insults in auténtico environments 
requires much more context, which indicates that such uses may be the effect of pragmatics. 
Out of the blue, auténtico gitano means robber, liar, etc. It is a default reading that can also 
have another, positive, reading. But audiences would not get this other reading unless the 




Gitano is probably the best exemplar of the category of ESTIs: gitano can have an 
extensional and neutral use, used by Romani and non-Romani alike. But it can also have 
a pejorative meaning, such that if a speaker calls A gitano in this second sense, she will 
be thereby insulting A, accusing A of being a robber, or a liar, or dirty, or all these and 
more things at the same time; by using gitano as an insult, the speaker also insults the 
Romani people at large. The pejorative meaning of portera ‘doorwoman’ conveys the 
idea of someone who spends the day gossiping, whose own life seems to be less 
important to themselves than the lives of the others. The ESTI has clear sexist 
connotations, as it is only used in the feminine variant (doormen are not assumed to be 
as gossiping as much as doorwomen).15 Camionero ‘truck driver’, in turn, conveys the 
idea that the targeted person is very rude, crude, and probably sexist. Pejorative uses of 
viejo ‘old man’ and vieja ‘old woman’ refer to stereotypes associated to these two groups 
of the population: old men and women are assumed to be boring, grumpy, bitter and 
picky. Adolescente ‘teenager’ conveys the idea of someone who is volatile, non-
thoughtful, and not very serious. Finally, moro ‘Moor’ is not such a good exemplar, but it 
is perhaps a more interesting case— perhaps too interesting and complicated to deal 
with it here. Moro can have (at least) three different uses in the Spaniards’ common talk. 
Some people use it with a neutral, extensional, meaning: moro simply designates 
someone coming from North Africa. However, for many people moro is a slur and is used 
as such, i.e., it is a demeaning way to refer to people coming from North Africa. 
Additionally, it has another pejorative meaning: if someone says Mi novio es un moro 
(‘My boyfriend is a Moor’, with emphatic un), the meaning is that the boyfriend is super-
jealous, possessive and controlling—and, crucially, this boyfriend would not come from 
North Africa.  
The biggest, more obvious, difference between ESTIs and slurs is that slurs are 
typically and originally demeaning,16 whereas terms that are ESTIs have a purely 
extensional neutral use. Additionally, when ESTIs are actually used as insults, they are 
usually directed at people not in the neutral extension (i.e., one uses a pejoratively-meant 
gitano to insult a non-Romani, not a person of the Romani community). Thus, we will 
scarcely find “weapon” uses of ESTIs (Camp, 2016), i.e., demeaning uses directed at an 
addressee that belongs to a particular ethnic or social group. Also, ESTIs are two times 
                                               
15 As for the neutral use, a doorperson in Spain is someone who manages the main entrance of 
an apartment building.  
16 There are well-known non-pejorative uses of slurs, for instance after appropriation or linguistic 
reclamation (Brontsema 2004, Anderson and Lepore 2013, Ritchie 2017, Anderson 2018, a.o.). 
For the time being we will set such uses aside, as they are not relevant to the discussion 
concerning differences between ESTIs and slur-words at this point.  
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insulting: speakers who use an ESTI insult the addressee, but they also insult a social 
or ethnic group. Thus, by using gitano as an ESTI, speakers insult their addressees 
(calling them liars, robbers, etc.), but crucially they also insult Romani people at large by 
conveying that Romani people are liars, robbers, etc. This second layer of insult takes 
the form of a generic that expresses a stereotypical negative view and is not-at issue 
(NAI). The AI content of slurs is often said to be an extension, a group of people (though 
see Hom, 2008), whereas the AI content of an ESTI is a stereotype, which can be 
understood as a set of weighed features that is used to categorise (akin to a prototype).17 
The NAI content of a slur is plausibly attitudinal (see below), while the NAI content of an 
ESTI is a generic that expresses the negative stereotypical beliefs a community has 
about the target group. As a speaker of an ESTI endorses the social stereotype of a 
certain group when using the ESTI, the content that they convey is that they do believe 
that the group is as the stereotype depicts it.  
 
3.2. ESTIs: AI and NAI content (in comparison with insults and slurs) 
Our investigation of ESTIs is novel because it delineates a new category of words with 
pejorative meaning. We will begin by comparing the properties of ESTIs with those of 
slurs and insults, using diagnostics from the philosophical and semantics literature. 
Based on the conclusions drawn from these diagnostics, we propose to formalise ESTIs 
using a multi-dimensional model. There are also plausible differences between ESTIs 
and slurs concerning social meaning that stem from how ESTIs and slurs relate to their 
NAI content. We will also briefly comment on that issue in Section 3.2.   
 
Following recent literature on meaning types (Simons et al. 2011, Tonhauser et al. 2013, 
Beaver et al. 2017), we assume that, despite heterogeneity, it is interesting to study the 
contents that are not relevant to the main topic or Question Under Discussion as being 
NAI, irrespective of whether they are Conventional Implicatures (in the sense of Potts 
2005) or presuppositions. Moreover, as Simons et al. (2011) have shown, we will treat 
projectivity (i.e., the ability to survive in the syntactic scope of operators such as negation, 
the antecedent of a conditional or a question) as a property NAI content can have.18 
                                               
17 The word stereotype is used in several different ways in the literature. Here we will use it to 
refer to a categorization device that has a prototypical structure (basically: features and weighs), 
but that, unlike a prototype, is not an abstraction from encountered exemplars. Rather, a 
stereotype is typically based on social prejudices. For stereotype as sets of beliefs, we will use 
stereotypical beliefs.  
18 Although see, e.g., Martin (2016) on an account where projection and addressing the QUD 
are explicitly separate.  
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Among the types of NAI content, Gutzmann (2015) classifies ethnic slurs in the class 
of expressively colored expressions, building on Frege’s (1897/1979) notion of coloring 
as illustrated for cur (to be compared to dog) and on Potts’s (2007) notion of expressive 
(as a term that identifies independent, speaker-oriented, utterance-anchored, 
emotionally-charged content). Unlike other expressives such as damn, expressively-
colored expressions (and by extension ethnic slurs) are said to convey both AI and NAI 
content. That is, according to Gutzmann, an ethnic slur denotes an ethnic group and, at 
the same time, conveys a derogatory attitude. In this sense, they fall within the group 
McCready (2010) called mixed expressives. While this view is not universally shared 
(see especially Hom, 2008), it is, we take it, quite robustly shared in its general lines 
(see, e.g. Camp, 2013, 2016, Williamson, 2009, Jeshion, 2013). In any case, we think 
the “mixed expressives” view is a good starting point in our discussion.19 
Other than ethnic slurs, we want to compare ESTIs to evaluative nouns used as 
insults, such as idiota ‘idiot’, which fall within Potts’ (2007) expressives and Gutzmann’s 
(2015) pejorative epithets. They are said to merely convey NAI content and no AI 
content, on the basis of examples such as (22). 
(22) That idiot Kresge dropped the bottle again. (Potts 2007b: 168) 
To tease apart the AI and NAI content of expressive terms, we can observe the effect 
of an operator such as negation, (23) and (24). 
(23) Wolfgang is not a Kraut. 
a. AI: ‘Wolfgang is not a German.’ 
b. NAI: ‘I despise the German.’ 
(24) That idiot Kresge has not dropped the bottle again. 
a. AI: ‘Kresge has not dropped the bottle again.’ 
b. NAI: ‘Kresge is an idiot.’ 
 Let us now move to the Spanish data, starting with the negation of gitano 
‘Romani-ESTI’ as our example for ESTI. As anticipated in section 2, terms that occur as 
ESTIs can be interpreted both as extensional terms that can appear bare as the attribute 
of the copula, (25), or can be evaluative terms combined with the emphatic indefinite un, 
(26). 
(25) El Chato no es gitano. 
‘El Chato is not a gipsy.’ 
a. AI: ¬(𝐫𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐢(𝐜)). 
b. NAI: ∅. 
(26) Manuel no es un gitano. 
                                               
19 We will revisit theories of slurs in section 3.3. 
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‘Manuel is not a gipsy.’ 
a. AI: ¬(𝐫𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐢 − 𝐁𝐀𝐃(𝐦)) 
b. NAI: Romanies are robbers, liars, dirty. 
 A negated ethnic/social group term without un (25), only means that the subject does 
not belong to the extension; there is no NAI material. The pejorative use of an 
ethnic/social group term, i.e., an ESTI, which has un (26), has the conventional AI 
meaning that the target lacks the negative characteristics of that ethnic/social group, 
indicated in (26)a as romani-BAD.20 In addition, the ESTI conveys a NAI, negative 
generalisation about that group. As mentioned above, we observe that an ESTI (26) is 
odd if directed towards a member of the demeaned group. Let us now compare this 
behaviour with that of pejorative epithets (27) and ethnic slurs (28). 
(27) El   idiota de Iñigo   no ha roto la botella. 
  the  idiot       of    Iñigo   NEG has broken the bottle 
‘That idiot Iñigo didn’t break the bottle.’ 
a. AI: ¬𝐛𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐤(𝐢, 𝛊𝒙(𝐛𝐨𝐭𝐭𝐥𝐞(𝒙)). 
b. NAI: 𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐨𝐭(𝐢). 
(28) Pascal no    es (*un) gabacho. 
    Pascal   NEG    is   a.MASC French_slur 
‘Pascal is not a French_slur.’ 
a. AI: ¬(𝐟𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐩)). 
b. NAI: ‘I have a negative attitude towards French people.’ 
As an epithet occurring in the N1 of an N2 construction, idiota survives the scope of 
negation, so the proposition that Iñigo is an idiot is conveyed as a NAI content, while the 
AI content is the proposition denoted by the sentence without the epithet (i.e., that Iñigo 
has not broken the bottle). Note that, if we place idiota as the attribute of a copular 
construction—which would be desirable for comparison of minimal pairs—the pejorative 
adjective does not convey NAI content, but is the main predicate of the AI content (as 
said before, it is relevant to the main topic or Question Under Discussion). This can be 
observed in (29). 
                                               
20 The fact that in principle gitano in (26) can convey also a positive meaning (say, Manuel is not 
a free spirit loyal to the community) does not tell against this analysis of how ESTIs work when 
they are used as insults (i.e., when the meaning selected is the negative stereotype). If we are 
right, and the negative stereotype is one of the conventional meanings of gitano, what we are 
describing is how such meaning is factored out in terms of AI and NAI content. However, let us 
insist that such a positive meaning of un gitano is rare and requires a lot of context. As we have 
said before, such a use of un gitano is akin to phrases such as un Lannister, such that Manuel 
no es un gitano would be relevantly similar to Tyron no es un Lannister (‘Tyron is not a 
Lannister’), meaning “Tyron does not share the values that the Lannisters are supposed to 
have”. We even have doubts about whether the sentence by itself, without prosodic emphasis 
or the addition of auténtico, would success in conveying the positive meaning. Thanks to a 
referee for reminding us at this point that (26) could have a different reading.   
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(29) Iñigo no   es un        idiota. 
Iñigo   NEG   is   a.MASC    idiot 
‘Iñigo is not an idiot.’ 
a. AI: ¬(𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐨𝐭(𝐢)). 
b. NAI: ∅. 
So, pejorative adjectives used as insults are only NAI carriers when they are modifiers, 
not when they are predicates. Additionally, note that the pejorative can be introduced by 
the indefinite or appear as bare, as shown in (30). 
(30) Iñigo no es idiota. 
Iñigo  NEG is   idiotic 
‘Iñigo is not idiotic.’ 
a. AI: ¬(𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐜(𝐢)). 
b. NAI: ∅. 
 In the former case (29), we are dealing with the evaluative noun, which is introduced by 
emphatic un. In the latter case (30), idiota is an adjective, translated as ‘idiotic’, and it is 
expected to be a bare predicate in the copular construction. 
 As for ethnic slurs such as (28) above, let us note that typically slurs are quite 
unnatural when introduced by the emphatic indefinite, indicating that it is not an 
evaluative noun, unlike the pejorative noun idiota and ESTIs. Moreover, unlike our 
examples of ethnic/social terms in the bare condition, ethnic slurs do carry NAI content, 
which survives negation. 









Ethnic/social group terms 
e.g., gitano, portera 
‘gipsy’, ‘doorwoman’ 
     neutral               ESTI 
NOT 
S 
Iñigo no es un 
idiota. 
Pascal no es (*un) 
gabacho. 
Manuel no es 
gitano. 
Manuel no es un 
gitano. 
AI ¬(𝐢𝐝𝐢𝐨𝐭(𝐢)) ¬(𝐟𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐡(𝐩)) ¬(𝐫𝐨𝐦𝐚(𝐦)) ¬(𝐫𝐨𝐦𝐚―𝐁𝐀𝐃(𝐦)) 
 
NAI 
-- ‘I have a negative attitude 
towards French people’ 
-- ‘Gipsies are 
robbers/liars/dirty’ 
Table 1 Cross-category comparison of Spanish pejorative terms 
 
 
Going back to ESTIs, an utterance of (26) also states that Manuel is not a robber, a liar, 
etc., and so does not insult Manuel. Yet, it projects the NAI meaning that Romanies are 
robbers, liars, etc., thus indirectly insulting Romanies. Now, compared with slurs, we see 
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that a slur utterance, (28), projects an attitudinal NAI content, whereas the content 
projected by an ESTI, (26), is a generic statement that has the effect of ascribing certain 
negative stereotypical beliefs to Romanies as a group. This is at least what we have 
assumed as a starting point in or discussion. We now turn to revisit the issue of what AI 
and NAI contents slurs plausibly have (always vis a vis ESTIs). 
 
3.3. More on the content of ESTIs and slurs: attitudes and stereotyping  
 
The view about slurs that we have taken to build the contrast between slurs and ESTIs 
assumes a thin attitudinal NAI content (“I despise group X”).21 However, different 
accounts of slurs either confer a richer NAI content to slurs or differ from the mixed 
expressives view at the level of AI content. Hom (2008) is the most notable exception to 
the predominant attitudinal view, as he argues that the AI content of a slur is of the form 
presented in (31), where ps stand for discriminatory treatments, ds for negative 
properties, and X for the despised group. 
 
(31) ought to be subject to p1+…pn because of being d1+…dn, all because of being 
X. 
That is, when speakers say of someone, A, that he or she is an S, they are stating that 
A ought to be treated in a certain (harmful) way because A has certain stereotypical 
features proper to the ethnic or social group A belongs to. However, several other 
authors include stereotypical beliefs in either dimension of the content of slur words. 
Camp (2013, 2016), for instance, includes stereotypical beliefs in the NAI content of 
slurs, such that the attitude, according to her view, is directed not towards the slurred 
group, but towards the group-as-depicted by some negative stereotype. Tirrell (1999) 
holds that stereotypes are part of the inferential content of slurs, and Williamson (2009) 
argues that the negative stereotype is part of the NAI content (a conventional implicature) 
of the slur. On the other hand, it could be said that ESTIs also have an attitudinal 
component: one would not use the ESTI gitano if one did not have a negative attitude 
towards Romanies.  
                                               
21 Several authors (e.g. Williamson, 2009, Marques & Garcia-Carpintero, forth.) have rightly 
objected to this simple expressivist view: if the NAI content of a slur is just an expression of a 
subjective attitude, the audience should have no problem in accepting the use of the slur. 
However, this is not how we, as the audience, react to the use of a slur. Marques & García-
Carpintero (forth.) argue that the NAI content of slurs has a normative component: “one must 
derogate group F”. We are not convinced that such normative content has to also include 
reference to stereotypical features of the target group, as Marques and García-Carpintero imply. 
In any case, for the purpose of this paper, it does not matter much that the thin attitudinal view 
is not correct. The contrast between slurs and ESTIs can be drawn also if the NAI content of 




So the question may arise whether we have exaggerated the differences between one 
set of terms and the other. But before we tackle this issue, let us remind the reader where 
we are: we have already provided several linguistic arguments in Section 2 that show 
how slurs and ESTIs are different kinds of terms. Namely, although both kinds of terms 
are pejoratives, only ESTIs behave as evaluatives. What we will do now is examine in a 
bit more detail their differences pertaining to content, in particular to the role that 
stereotyping and attitudes play in each case. In this respect, the most obvious difference 
between ESTIs and slurs lies in their AI content. The AI content of an ESTI is the set of 
properties that the social stereotype ascribes to the targeted group. In Hom’s view, this 
set of properties form part of the AI content of a slur as well, but even in this case there 
are deep differences between the AI content of an ESTI and the AI content of a slur.  
First of all, in Hom’s view John is a K has a prescriptive content that John is an ESTI by 
all lights lacks. Also, John is an ESTI simply states that John has a number of properties 
that the socially shared negative stereotype ascribes to the insulted group, whereas the 
role that the stereotype plays in the AI content of the slur according to Hom is 
motivational: it justifies the prescriptive content. That is, it putatively provides the reason 
why we should treat members of the group in a bad way. So slurs on his account include 
an evaluative component, but, linguistically, they are not themselves evaluatives, as 
ESTIs are (see above).  
 
This said, we think that there are sharper differences between the role that attitudes (or 
prescriptions about attitudes) and stereotypes play in ESTIs and the role they play in 
slurs, which incidentally make us think that the simple attitudinal/prescriptional view on 
slurs is overall preferable to other accounts. Although our purpose is not to commit to 
any particular view on slurs, we concur with Jeshion’s (2013) idea that stereotypes and 
stereotypical beliefs are associations elicited by the use of slurs rather than part of their 
(AI or NAI) content. Our view is that stereotyping is not essential to slurring, but is 
essential to using ESTIs, while expressing or prescribing a negative attitude is essential 
to slurring but not to using ESTIs. To begin with, some slurs may actually lack a 
stereotypical component. Our own example gabacho is a case in point. Spaniards’ 
current use of gabacho may not involve any stereotype of French people; rather, we 
would say that it is used just to look down on French people. Speakers are aware that it 
is a word that they can use instead of francés ‘French’, which has the effect of denigrating 
French people, but it is at least debatable whether many of them would also believe that 
gabacho elicits particular stereotypical beliefs that francés does not. We wanted to point 
towards this possibility, because the literature often focuses on slurs that have strong 
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stereotypical associations and generalizes from there. However, a second reason why 
we think that stereotypes play different roles in slurs vis a vis ESTIs is that speakers 
could always detach themselves from the ascription of stereotypical properties, (32), 
while the stereotypical component of an ESTI is compulsory, since it appears already in 
the AI content, (33). 
 
(32) I know you are not [stereotype], but you’ll still always be a Kraut.   SLUR 
(33) #Sé       que no eres   un-a chismos-a, pero siempre serás un-a porter-a.  ESTI 
know.1SG that NEG are.2SG a-FEM gossip-FEM but always are.FUT.2SG      a-FEM doorperson-FEM 
‘#I know you are not a gossip, but you’ll still always be a doorwoman.’ 
 
In the case of the role of attitudes, things seem to be the other way around. For instance, 
it will typically be the case that the speaker of the ESTI in (26) has a negative attitude 
towards Romanies, but such an attitude is not part of an ESTI’s NAI content: a speaker 
can actually cancel the expression of the attitude, but not that of the generic statement. 
An influential person in the criminal underworld who values some of the stereotypes 
associated with gitano could say (34).  
(34) Por desgracia, Manuel no es un        gitano.  
by misfortune        Manuel    NEG is   a.MASC  Romani.MASC 
‘Unfortunately, Manuel is not a Romani-ESTI.’  
 
In this case, the speaker, while committing to the generic NAI content, and thus 
potentially offending Romani people, does not express a negative attitude towards them. 
She would endorse the negative stereotype, but the attitude she expresses would be 
positive rather than negative. A way to see the difference between attitudes in slurs vs. 
ESTIs is this: if the speaker is not totally ignorant of what a certain slur, say, Kraut, 
means, it seems a performative contradiction (appropriation uses aside) to say the slur-
containing (35). In contrast, it does not seem like a performative contradiction to utter the 
ESTI-containing (36). 
(35) #You are a Kraut. I like people like you.  
(36) Eres    un      gitano. Me gusta la        gente como tú. 
are.2SG a.MASC Romani   me   like      the.FEM people  like you 
 ‘You are a Romani-ESTI. I like people like you.’  
 
Let us be clear on one issue: ESTIs like gitano are used typically as insults. In such 
typical cases, the speaker conveys a negative attitude towards Romanies. It is certainly 
strange to have a positive attitude towards a series of vices (which is what romani-BAD) 
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stands for. The point we are trying to make is that, strange as it is, it is in some contexts 
possible to not have such a negative attitude towards such vices and thus to not convey 
a negative attitude towards Romanies when using gitano in its pejorative sense.  
 
We take it that, ideally, one could distinguish two ways of being racist/classist: one is by 
simply despising people of a different ethnic or class origin; the other one is by negatively 
stereotyping a different ethnic or class group. Usually, a racist/classist does both things 
at the same time, but ideally again, it is possible to separate both components. ESTIs 
seem to display more the stereotype-based racism/classism, while slurs seem to be 
more on the despising-type racism/classism side. 
 
Nunberg (2017) argues that also the attitudinal component of a slur is defeasible. He 
uses the non-appropriation example of redskin, which for some people has positive 
connotations, e.g., of bravery and authenticity. People who use redskin with those 
associations in mind have a positive attitude towards Native Americans, so it cannot be 
said that the NAI content of redskin is one of contempt (or, in general, negative). Yet, 
according to Nunberg, redskin in the mouths of these well-meaning people is still a slur, 
as it potentially offends Native Americans, who would refuse any characterisation that 
comes from the one-sided view that hegemonic narratives have construed about them. 
Nunberg’s own view about the NAI content of slurs is that it derives from a Manner 
Implicature: the slurring speaker chooses to speak in the way that prejudiced and racist 
people speak. If Nunberg is right about this, then the difference between slurs and ESTIs 
should be located at a different level: while slurs’ demeaning content arises by way of a 
conversational implicature, ESTI’s demeaning content is part of its semantics. It is 
possible to find well-meaning uses of gitano but those will not be pejorative.22 However, 
when gitano is used to refer to the stereotype “liar, robber, etc.”, its pejorative, 
stereotypical, content is inevitable. Using the term gitano to tell someone that he/she is 
a liar and a robber cannot but demean the people of the Romani community. The NAI 
content, confirming the negative stereotypical beliefs towards that ethnic group, follows 
automatically. 
  
3.4. Social meaning 
 
Related to this: there are also some differences between ESTIs and slurs at the level of 
social meaning, which also reveals something about their AI and NAI content. ESTIs, as 
                                               
22 On this, see subsections 2.2. and 2.4., and especially footnote 13. 
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well as slurs, are carriers of social meaning (Eckert, 2008); that is, they embed a fluid 
cluster of social information that tells something about the values and beliefs of the 
speaker uttering the slur/ESTI. Typically, the use of slurs and ESTIs conveys information 
concerning the speaker’s values as well as about certain assumptions she makes about 
the audience. Speakers who use ESTIs and slurs always signal themselves as 
prejudiced against certain ethnic/social groups, disregarding their intentions. That is, 
even when the speaker has not willingly chosen to use a slur or an ESTI, she emerges 
as a racist/classist and prejudiced person. Yet, slurs can have developments in this 
dimension that ESTIs cannot. 
  
A speaker who states that a certain person, Manolo, is a gitano-ESTI expresses that it 
is correct to apply the stereotype of Romanies to Manolo and conveys that the people of 
the Romani community are liars, cheaters and thieves (or that Romanies are like the 
stereotype depicts them). By doing this, this speaker signals herself as prejudiced and 
racist. This is a direct consequence of the NAI content attached to any utterance of (26). 
In many cases discussed in the literature, social meaning is attached to variants or 
alternatives (Eckert, 2008, Burnett, 2016: e.g., using –ing or –in’, Burnett, forthcoming), 
such that each variant (e.g. –ing) correlates with a certain kind of social group and signals 
that the user of the variant belongs to that group. This is also how Nunberg (2017) deals 
with the issue of the social meaning of slurs: according to him, slurs have the social 
meaning they have because they are the way that certain (racist, classist, prejudiced) 
groups refer to other groups. There are usually several different variants or alternatives 
to refer to a certain group of people: using one instead of another signals affiliation with 
a way of thinking. To the extent that social meaning in these cases requires variants or 
alternatives, if we were to remove one of the alternatives and homogenise ways of 
speaking, the social meaning attached to the other, preserved, alternative would 
disappear. For example, suppose that little by little the –ing variant disappears and 
everybody pronounces –in’. In such a case, an external observer would not attach any 
social significance to the use of –in’.  
 
Now we are not sure whether the same applies to slurs (i.e., we are not sure whether 
the social meaning attached to slurs is related to the existence of a neutral alternative). 
Most authors take it that slurs contrast with “neutral” counterparts and relate their social 
significance to the existence of such counterparts (e.g., Bolinger, 2017, Nunberg, 2017). 
However, that the Romans had only the word ‘barbarian’ to refer to the people not 
belonging to the Roman or the Greek civilisations does not seem to make ‘barbarian’ 
less pejorative and racist. On the other hand, a slur can become dominant (vis a vis its 
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alternatives) precisely because it loses its derogatory connotations, via reappropriation 
and afterwards normalisation. In such a case, the slur effectively ceases to signal 
racism/classism/sexism. However, this is something that would not happen with an ESTI, 
because no matter what, we would think that the insulting use of gitano is racist and 
prejudiced, even if it were the only word that Spanish speakers had to refer to people 
who are conceived as liars, cheaters, thieves, etc. So, it seems that the social meaning 
associated with an ESTI is associated with its contribution to NAI content (i.e., the 
negative stereotyping of the target group), which is stable in a way that the NAI (mainly 
attitudinal) content of a slur is not. That is, insofar as an ESTI has the AI content that it 
has, it cannot but convey the NAI content that it conveys. The case of the slur is different: 
it can retain its AI content, but change its NAI content.23 
 
3.5. Summary 
In Section 2 we showed that ESTIs and slurs appear in different linguistic environments. 
This is enough to believe that they are different kinds of pejoratives. In this section we 
have focused on their differences at the level of AI and NAI content. The comparison is 
not straightforward, as there are various accounts of the contents of slurs. We have tried 
to show that differences will arise no matter what theory of slurs one endorses. Still, we 
have tried to provide arguments for the view that stereotyping is essential to ESTI-ing 
while attitude expression (modulo evolutions such as appropriation) is essential to 
slurring. Finally, by exploring the issue of social meaning, we have suggested that 
phenomena such as appropriation can be described as having effects only on the NAI 
content of slurs. In the case of ESTIs, ESTIs can only stop being pejorative if they change 
their AI content.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Ethnic and social terms that are used as insults while retaining a neutral, non-slurring, 
meaning, form a class of pejorative expressions that has not been studied in the by now 
rich literature on pejoratives. One plausible reason for this gap is that examples do not 
abound in English. In this paper we have focused on European Spanish, where this kind 
of terms is widespread. We have shown that ESTIs form a class within pejoratives using 
several linguistic tests that reveal that ESTIs, unlike slurs, appear in the syntactic 
environments of evaluatives. We have analysed the contribution that ESTIs make to 
contents as occurring in two dimensions: at the at-issue level, the meaning of an ESTI is 
a stereotype; at the not-at-issue level, it is a generic that captures the socially shared 
                                               
23 In an account such as Hom’s (2008), this point would have to be expressed differently. But 
the difference would persist under a different description of the phenomenon. 
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stereotypic beliefs in a community. We have compared ESTIs with slurs also with respect 
to their content, and in particular with respect to the roles that stereotyping and attitude 
expression play in the articulation of such contents. Our conclusion is that while slurs’ 
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